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quakequest/Projects/Android/jni/crypto.c
Simon 54a544769d Initial Commit - Work in progress..
2019-05-30 06:57:57 +01:00

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// TODO key loading, generating, saving
#include "quakedef.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "thread.h"
#include "hmac.h"
#include "libcurl.h"
cvar_t crypto_developer = {CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_developer", "0", "print extra info about crypto handshake"};
cvar_t crypto_servercpupercent = {CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_servercpupercent", "10", "allowed crypto CPU load in percent for server operation (0 = no limit, faster)"};
cvar_t crypto_servercpumaxtime = {CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_servercpumaxtime", "0.01", "maximum allowed crypto CPU time per frame (0 = no limit)"};
cvar_t crypto_servercpudebug = {CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_servercpudebug", "0", "print statistics about time usage by crypto"};
static double crypto_servercpu_accumulator = 0;
static double crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime = 0;
cvar_t crypto_aeslevel = {CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_aeslevel", "1", "whether to support AES encryption in authenticated connections (0 = no, 1 = supported, 2 = requested, 3 = required)"};
int crypto_keyfp_recommended_length;
static const char *crypto_idstring = NULL;
static char crypto_idstring_buf[512];
#define PROTOCOL_D0_BLIND_ID FOURCC_D0PK
#define PROTOCOL_VLEN (('v' << 0) | ('l' << 8) | ('e' << 16) | ('n' << 24))
// BEGIN stuff shared with crypto-keygen-standalone
#define FOURCC_D0PK (('d' << 0) | ('0' << 8) | ('p' << 16) | ('k' << 24))
#define FOURCC_D0SK (('d' << 0) | ('0' << 8) | ('s' << 16) | ('k' << 24))
#define FOURCC_D0PI (('d' << 0) | ('0' << 8) | ('p' << 16) | ('i' << 24))
#define FOURCC_D0SI (('d' << 0) | ('0' << 8) | ('s' << 16) | ('i' << 24))
#define FOURCC_D0IQ (('d' << 0) | ('0' << 8) | ('i' << 16) | ('q' << 24))
#define FOURCC_D0IR (('d' << 0) | ('0' << 8) | ('i' << 16) | ('r' << 24))
#define FOURCC_D0ER (('d' << 0) | ('0' << 8) | ('e' << 16) | ('r' << 24))
#define FOURCC_D0IC (('d' << 0) | ('0' << 8) | ('i' << 16) | ('c' << 24))
static unsigned long Crypto_LittleLong(const char *data)
{
return
((unsigned char) data[0]) |
(((unsigned char) data[1]) << 8) |
(((unsigned char) data[2]) << 16) |
(((unsigned char) data[3]) << 24);
}
static void Crypto_UnLittleLong(char *data, unsigned long l)
{
data[0] = l & 0xFF;
data[1] = (l >> 8) & 0xFF;
data[2] = (l >> 16) & 0xFF;
data[3] = (l >> 24) & 0xFF;
}
static size_t Crypto_ParsePack(const char *buf, size_t len, unsigned long header, const char **lumps, size_t *lumpsize, size_t nlumps)
{
size_t i;
size_t pos;
pos = 0;
if(header)
{
if(len < 4)
return 0;
if(Crypto_LittleLong(buf) != header)
return 0;
pos += 4;
}
for(i = 0; i < nlumps; ++i)
{
if(pos + 4 > len)
return 0;
lumpsize[i] = Crypto_LittleLong(&buf[pos]);
pos += 4;
if(pos + lumpsize[i] > len)
return 0;
lumps[i] = &buf[pos];
pos += lumpsize[i];
}
return pos;
}
static size_t Crypto_UnParsePack(char *buf, size_t len, unsigned long header, const char *const *lumps, const size_t *lumpsize, size_t nlumps)
{
size_t i;
size_t pos;
pos = 0;
if(header)
{
if(len < 4)
return 0;
Crypto_UnLittleLong(buf, header);
pos += 4;
}
for(i = 0; i < nlumps; ++i)
{
if(pos + 4 + lumpsize[i] > len)
return 0;
Crypto_UnLittleLong(&buf[pos], lumpsize[i]);
pos += 4;
memcpy(&buf[pos], lumps[i], lumpsize[i]);
pos += lumpsize[i];
}
return pos;
}
// END stuff shared with xonotic-keygen
#define USE_AES
#ifdef CRYPTO_STATIC
#include <d0_blind_id/d0_blind_id.h>
#define d0_blind_id_dll 1
#define Crypto_OpenLibrary() true
#define Crypto_CloseLibrary()
#define qd0_blind_id_new d0_blind_id_new
#define qd0_blind_id_free d0_blind_id_free
//#define qd0_blind_id_clear d0_blind_id_clear
#define qd0_blind_id_copy d0_blind_id_copy
//#define qd0_blind_id_generate_private_key d0_blind_id_generate_private_key
//#define qd0_blind_id_generate_private_key_fastreject d0_blind_id_generate_private_key_fastreject
//#define qd0_blind_id_read_private_key d0_blind_id_read_private_key
#define qd0_blind_id_read_public_key d0_blind_id_read_public_key
//#define qd0_blind_id_write_private_key d0_blind_id_write_private_key
//#define qd0_blind_id_write_public_key d0_blind_id_write_public_key
#define qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_key d0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_key
//#define qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_modulus d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_modulus
#define qd0_blind_id_read_private_id_modulus d0_blind_id_read_private_id_modulus
//#define qd0_blind_id_write_private_id_modulus d0_blind_id_write_private_id_modulus
#define qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_start d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_start
#define qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_request d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_request
//#define qd0_blind_id_answer_private_id_request d0_blind_id_answer_private_id_request
#define qd0_blind_id_finish_private_id_request d0_blind_id_finish_private_id_request
//#define qd0_blind_id_read_private_id_request_camouflage d0_blind_id_read_private_id_request_camouflage
//#define qd0_blind_id_write_private_id_request_camouflage d0_blind_id_write_private_id_request_camouflage
#define qd0_blind_id_read_private_id d0_blind_id_read_private_id
//#define qd0_blind_id_read_public_id d0_blind_id_read_public_id
#define qd0_blind_id_write_private_id d0_blind_id_write_private_id
//#define qd0_blind_id_write_public_id d0_blind_id_write_public_id
#define qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start
#define qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge
#define qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_response d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_response
#define qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify
#define qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id d0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id
#define qd0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id d0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id
#define qd0_blind_id_INITIALIZE d0_blind_id_INITIALIZE
#define qd0_blind_id_SHUTDOWN d0_blind_id_SHUTDOWN
#define qd0_blind_id_util_sha256 d0_blind_id_util_sha256
#define qd0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign d0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign
#define qd0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign_detached d0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign_detached
#define qd0_blind_id_setmallocfuncs d0_blind_id_setmallocfuncs
#define qd0_blind_id_setmutexfuncs d0_blind_id_setmutexfuncs
#define qd0_blind_id_verify_public_id d0_blind_id_verify_public_id
#define qd0_blind_id_verify_private_id d0_blind_id_verify_private_id
#else
// d0_blind_id interface
#define D0_EXPORT
#ifdef __GNUC__
#define D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__((warn_unused_result))
#else
#define D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT
#endif
#define D0_BOOL int
typedef void *(d0_malloc_t)(size_t len);
typedef void (d0_free_t)(void *p);
typedef void *(d0_createmutex_t)(void);
typedef void (d0_destroymutex_t)(void *);
typedef int (d0_lockmutex_t)(void *); // zero on success
typedef int (d0_unlockmutex_t)(void *); // zero on success
typedef struct d0_blind_id_s d0_blind_id_t;
typedef D0_BOOL (*d0_fastreject_function) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, void *pass);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT d0_blind_id_t *(*qd0_blind_id_new) (void);
static D0_EXPORT void (*qd0_blind_id_free) (d0_blind_id_t *a);
//static D0_EXPORT void (*qd0_blind_id_clear) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_copy) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const d0_blind_id_t *src);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_generate_private_key) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, int k);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_generate_private_key_fastreject) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, int k, d0_fastreject_function reject, void *pass);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_read_private_key) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_read_public_key) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_write_private_key) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_write_public_key) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_key) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_modulus) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_read_private_id_modulus) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_write_private_id_modulus) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_start) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_request) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_answer_private_id_request) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_finish_private_id_request) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_read_private_id_request_camouflage) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_write_private_id_request_camouflage) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_read_private_id) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_read_public_id) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_write_private_id) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
//static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_write_public_id) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, D0_BOOL is_first, D0_BOOL send_modulus, const char *message, size_t msglen, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, D0_BOOL is_first, D0_BOOL recv_modulus, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen, D0_BOOL *status);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_response) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, const char *inbuf, size_t inbuflen, char *msg, size_t *msglen, D0_BOOL *status);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id) (const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen); // can only be done after successful key exchange, this performs a modpow; key length is limited by SHA_DIGESTSIZE for now; also ONLY valid after successful d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify/d0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_INITIALIZE) (void);
static D0_EXPORT void (*qd0_blind_id_SHUTDOWN) (void);
static D0_EXPORT void (*qd0_blind_id_util_sha256) (char *out, const char *in, size_t n);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, D0_BOOL is_first, D0_BOOL send_modulus, const char *message, size_t msglen, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign_detached) (d0_blind_id_t *ctx, D0_BOOL is_first, D0_BOOL send_modulus, const char *message, size_t msglen, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen);
static D0_EXPORT void (*qd0_blind_id_setmallocfuncs)(d0_malloc_t *m, d0_free_t *f);
static D0_EXPORT void (*qd0_blind_id_setmutexfuncs)(d0_createmutex_t *c, d0_destroymutex_t *d, d0_lockmutex_t *l, d0_unlockmutex_t *u);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_verify_public_id)(const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, D0_BOOL *status);
static D0_EXPORT D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL (*qd0_blind_id_verify_private_id)(const d0_blind_id_t *ctx);
static dllfunction_t d0_blind_id_funcs[] =
{
{"d0_blind_id_new", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_new},
{"d0_blind_id_free", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_free},
//{"d0_blind_id_clear", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_clear},
{"d0_blind_id_copy", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_copy},
//{"d0_blind_id_generate_private_key", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_generate_private_key},
//{"d0_blind_id_generate_private_key_fastreject", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_generate_private_key_fastreject},
//{"d0_blind_id_read_private_key", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_read_private_key},
{"d0_blind_id_read_public_key", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_read_public_key},
//{"d0_blind_id_write_private_key", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_write_private_key},
//{"d0_blind_id_write_public_key", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_write_public_key},
{"d0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_key", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_key},
//{"d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_modulus", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_modulus},
{"d0_blind_id_read_private_id_modulus", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_read_private_id_modulus},
//{"d0_blind_id_write_private_id_modulus", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_write_private_id_modulus},
{"d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_start", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_start},
{"d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_request", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_request},
//{"d0_blind_id_answer_private_id_request", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_answer_private_id_request},
{"d0_blind_id_finish_private_id_request", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_finish_private_id_request},
//{"d0_blind_id_read_private_id_request_camouflage", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_read_private_id_request_camouflage},
//{"d0_blind_id_write_private_id_request_camouflage", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_write_private_id_request_camouflage},
{"d0_blind_id_read_private_id", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_read_private_id},
//{"d0_blind_id_read_public_id", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_read_public_id},
{"d0_blind_id_write_private_id", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_write_private_id},
//{"d0_blind_id_write_public_id", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_write_public_id},
{"d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start},
{"d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge},
{"d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_response", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_response},
{"d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify},
{"d0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id},
{"d0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id},
{"d0_blind_id_INITIALIZE", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_INITIALIZE},
{"d0_blind_id_SHUTDOWN", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_SHUTDOWN},
{"d0_blind_id_util_sha256", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_util_sha256},
{"d0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign},
{"d0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign_detached", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign_detached},
{"d0_blind_id_setmallocfuncs", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_setmallocfuncs},
{"d0_blind_id_setmutexfuncs", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_setmutexfuncs},
{"d0_blind_id_verify_public_id", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_verify_public_id},
{"d0_blind_id_verify_private_id", (void **) &qd0_blind_id_verify_private_id},
{NULL, NULL}
};
// end of d0_blind_id interface
static dllhandle_t d0_blind_id_dll = NULL;
static qboolean Crypto_OpenLibrary (void)
{
const char* dllnames [] =
{
#if defined(WIN32)
"libd0_blind_id-0.dll",
#elif defined(MACOSX)
"libd0_blind_id.0.dylib",
#else
"libd0_blind_id.so.0",
"libd0_blind_id.so", // FreeBSD
#endif
NULL
};
// Already loaded?
if (d0_blind_id_dll)
return true;
// Load the DLL
return Sys_LoadLibrary (dllnames, &d0_blind_id_dll, d0_blind_id_funcs);
}
static void Crypto_CloseLibrary (void)
{
Sys_UnloadLibrary (&d0_blind_id_dll);
}
#endif
#ifdef CRYPTO_RIJNDAEL_STATIC
#include <d0_blind_id/d0_rijndael.h>
#define d0_rijndael_dll 1
#define Crypto_Rijndael_OpenLibrary() true
#define Crypto_Rijndael_CloseLibrary()
#define qd0_rijndael_setup_encrypt d0_rijndael_setup_encrypt
#define qd0_rijndael_setup_decrypt d0_rijndael_setup_decrypt
#define qd0_rijndael_encrypt d0_rijndael_encrypt
#define qd0_rijndael_decrypt d0_rijndael_decrypt
#else
// no need to do the #define dance here, as the upper part declares out macros either way
D0_EXPORT int (*qd0_rijndael_setup_encrypt) (unsigned long *rk, const unsigned char *key,
int keybits);
D0_EXPORT int (*qd0_rijndael_setup_decrypt) (unsigned long *rk, const unsigned char *key,
int keybits);
D0_EXPORT void (*qd0_rijndael_encrypt) (const unsigned long *rk, int nrounds,
const unsigned char plaintext[16], unsigned char ciphertext[16]);
D0_EXPORT void (*qd0_rijndael_decrypt) (const unsigned long *rk, int nrounds,
const unsigned char ciphertext[16], unsigned char plaintext[16]);
#define D0_RIJNDAEL_KEYLENGTH(keybits) ((keybits)/8)
#define D0_RIJNDAEL_RKLENGTH(keybits) ((keybits)/8+28)
#define D0_RIJNDAEL_NROUNDS(keybits) ((keybits)/32+6)
static dllfunction_t d0_rijndael_funcs[] =
{
{"d0_rijndael_setup_decrypt", (void **) &qd0_rijndael_setup_decrypt},
{"d0_rijndael_setup_encrypt", (void **) &qd0_rijndael_setup_encrypt},
{"d0_rijndael_decrypt", (void **) &qd0_rijndael_decrypt},
{"d0_rijndael_encrypt", (void **) &qd0_rijndael_encrypt},
{NULL, NULL}
};
// end of d0_blind_id interface
static dllhandle_t d0_rijndael_dll = NULL;
static qboolean Crypto_Rijndael_OpenLibrary (void)
{
const char* dllnames [] =
{
#if defined(WIN32)
"libd0_rijndael-0.dll",
#elif defined(MACOSX)
"libd0_rijndael.0.dylib",
#else
"libd0_rijndael.so.0",
"libd0_rijndael.so", // FreeBSD
#endif
NULL
};
// Already loaded?
if (d0_rijndael_dll)
return true;
// Load the DLL
return Sys_LoadLibrary (dllnames, &d0_rijndael_dll, d0_rijndael_funcs);
}
static void Crypto_Rijndael_CloseLibrary (void)
{
Sys_UnloadLibrary (&d0_rijndael_dll);
}
#endif
// various helpers
void sha256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, int n)
{
qd0_blind_id_util_sha256((char *) out, (const char *) in, n);
}
static size_t Crypto_LoadFile(const char *path, char *buf, size_t nmax, qboolean inuserdir)
{
char vabuf[1024];
qfile_t *f = NULL;
fs_offset_t n;
if(inuserdir)
f = FS_SysOpen(va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "%s%s", *fs_userdir ? fs_userdir : fs_basedir, path), "rb", false);
else
f = FS_SysOpen(va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "%s%s", fs_basedir, path), "rb", false);
if(!f)
return 0;
n = FS_Read(f, buf, nmax);
if(n < 0)
n = 0;
FS_Close(f);
return (size_t) n;
}
static qboolean PutWithNul(char **data, size_t *len, const char *str)
{
// invariant: data points to insertion point
size_t l = strlen(str);
if(l >= *len)
return false;
memcpy(*data, str, l+1);
*data += l+1;
*len -= l+1;
return true;
}
static const char *GetUntilNul(const char **data, size_t *len)
{
// invariant: data points to next character to take
const char *data_save = *data;
size_t n;
const char *p;
if(!*data)
return NULL;
if(!*len)
{
*data = NULL;
return NULL;
}
p = (const char *) memchr(*data, 0, *len);
if(!p) // no terminating NUL
{
*data = NULL;
*len = 0;
return NULL;
}
else
{
n = (p - *data) + 1;
*len -= n;
*data += n;
if(*len == 0)
*data = NULL;
return (const char *) data_save;
}
*data = NULL;
return NULL;
}
// d0pk reading
static d0_blind_id_t *Crypto_ReadPublicKey(char *buf, size_t len)
{
d0_blind_id_t *pk = NULL;
const char *p[2];
size_t l[2];
if(Crypto_ParsePack(buf, len, FOURCC_D0PK, p, l, 2))
{
pk = qd0_blind_id_new();
if(pk)
if(qd0_blind_id_read_public_key(pk, p[0], l[0]))
if(qd0_blind_id_read_private_id_modulus(pk, p[1], l[1]))
return pk;
}
if(pk)
qd0_blind_id_free(pk);
return NULL;
}
// d0si reading
static qboolean Crypto_AddPrivateKey(d0_blind_id_t *pk, char *buf, size_t len)
{
const char *p[1];
size_t l[1];
if(Crypto_ParsePack(buf, len, FOURCC_D0SI, p, l, 1))
{
if(qd0_blind_id_read_private_id(pk, p[0], l[0]))
return true;
}
return false;
}
#define MAX_PUBKEYS 16
static d0_blind_id_t *pubkeys[MAX_PUBKEYS];
static char pubkeys_fp64[MAX_PUBKEYS][FP64_SIZE+1];
static qboolean pubkeys_havepriv[MAX_PUBKEYS];
static qboolean pubkeys_havesig[MAX_PUBKEYS];
static char pubkeys_priv_fp64[MAX_PUBKEYS][FP64_SIZE+1];
static char challenge_append[1400];
static size_t challenge_append_length;
static int keygen_i = -1;
static char keygen_buf[8192];
#define MAX_CRYPTOCONNECTS 16
#define CRYPTOCONNECT_NONE 0
#define CRYPTOCONNECT_PRECONNECT 1
#define CRYPTOCONNECT_CONNECT 2
#define CRYPTOCONNECT_RECONNECT 3
#define CRYPTOCONNECT_DUPLICATE 4
typedef struct server_cryptoconnect_s
{
double lasttime;
lhnetaddress_t address;
crypto_t crypto;
int next_step;
}
server_cryptoconnect_t;
static server_cryptoconnect_t cryptoconnects[MAX_CRYPTOCONNECTS];
static int cdata_id = 0;
typedef struct
{
d0_blind_id_t *id;
int s, c;
int next_step;
char challenge[2048];
char wantserver_idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
qboolean wantserver_aes;
int cdata_id;
}
crypto_data_t;
// crypto specific helpers
#define CDATA ((crypto_data_t *) crypto->data)
#define MAKE_CDATA if(!crypto->data) crypto->data = Z_Malloc(sizeof(crypto_data_t))
#define CLEAR_CDATA if(crypto->data) { if(CDATA->id) qd0_blind_id_free(CDATA->id); Z_Free(crypto->data); } crypto->data = NULL
static crypto_t *Crypto_ServerFindInstance(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, qboolean allow_create)
{
crypto_t *crypto;
int i, best;
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return NULL; // no support
for(i = 0; i < MAX_CRYPTOCONNECTS; ++i)
if(LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cryptoconnects[i].address))
break;
if(i < MAX_CRYPTOCONNECTS && (allow_create || cryptoconnects[i].crypto.data))
{
crypto = &cryptoconnects[i].crypto;
cryptoconnects[i].lasttime = realtime;
return crypto;
}
if(!allow_create)
return NULL;
best = 0;
for(i = 1; i < MAX_CRYPTOCONNECTS; ++i)
if(cryptoconnects[i].lasttime < cryptoconnects[best].lasttime)
best = i;
crypto = &cryptoconnects[best].crypto;
cryptoconnects[best].lasttime = realtime;
memcpy(&cryptoconnects[best].address, peeraddress, sizeof(cryptoconnects[best].address));
CLEAR_CDATA;
return crypto;
}
qboolean Crypto_ServerFinishInstance(crypto_t *out, crypto_t *crypto)
{
// no check needed here (returned pointers are only used in prefilled fields)
if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated)
{
Con_Printf("Passed an invalid crypto connect instance\n");
memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
return false;
}
CLEAR_CDATA;
memcpy(out, crypto, sizeof(*out));
memset(crypto, 0, sizeof(*crypto));
return true;
}
crypto_t *Crypto_ServerGetInstance(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
{
// no check needed here (returned pointers are only used in prefilled fields)
return Crypto_ServerFindInstance(peeraddress, false);
}
typedef struct crypto_storedhostkey_s
{
struct crypto_storedhostkey_s *next;
lhnetaddress_t addr;
int keyid;
char idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
int aeslevel;
}
crypto_storedhostkey_t;
static crypto_storedhostkey_t *crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE];
static void Crypto_InitHostKeys(void)
{
int i;
for(i = 0; i < CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE; ++i)
crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[i] = NULL;
}
static void Crypto_ClearHostKeys(void)
{
int i;
crypto_storedhostkey_t *hk, *hkn;
for(i = 0; i < CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE; ++i)
{
for(hk = crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[i]; hk; hk = hkn)
{
hkn = hk->next;
Z_Free(hk);
}
crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[i] = NULL;
}
}
static qboolean Crypto_ClearHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
{
char buf[128];
int hashindex;
crypto_storedhostkey_t **hkp;
qboolean found = false;
LHNETADDRESS_ToString(peeraddress, buf, sizeof(buf), 1);
hashindex = CRC_Block((const unsigned char *) buf, strlen(buf)) % CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE;
for(hkp = &crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[hashindex]; *hkp && LHNETADDRESS_Compare(&((*hkp)->addr), peeraddress); hkp = &((*hkp)->next));
if(*hkp)
{
crypto_storedhostkey_t *hk = *hkp;
*hkp = hk->next;
Z_Free(hk);
found = true;
}
return found;
}
static void Crypto_StoreHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *keystring, qboolean complain)
{
char buf[128];
int hashindex;
crypto_storedhostkey_t *hk;
int keyid;
char idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
int aeslevel;
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return;
// syntax of keystring:
// aeslevel id@key id@key ...
if(!*keystring)
return;
aeslevel = bound(0, *keystring - '0', 3);
while(*keystring && *keystring != ' ')
++keystring;
keyid = -1;
while(*keystring && keyid < 0)
{
// id@key
const char *idstart, *idend, *keystart, *keyend;
++keystring; // skip the space
idstart = keystring;
while(*keystring && *keystring != ' ' && *keystring != '@')
++keystring;
idend = keystring;
if(!*keystring)
break;
++keystring;
keystart = keystring;
while(*keystring && *keystring != ' ')
++keystring;
keyend = keystring;
if(idend - idstart == FP64_SIZE && keyend - keystart == FP64_SIZE)
{
for(keyid = 0; keyid < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++keyid)
if(pubkeys[keyid])
if(!memcmp(pubkeys_fp64[keyid], keystart, FP64_SIZE))
{
memcpy(idfp, idstart, FP64_SIZE);
idfp[FP64_SIZE] = 0;
break;
}
if(keyid >= MAX_PUBKEYS)
keyid = -1;
}
}
if(keyid < 0)
return;
LHNETADDRESS_ToString(peeraddress, buf, sizeof(buf), 1);
hashindex = CRC_Block((const unsigned char *) buf, strlen(buf)) % CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE;
for(hk = crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[hashindex]; hk && LHNETADDRESS_Compare(&hk->addr, peeraddress); hk = hk->next);
if(hk)
{
if(complain)
{
if(hk->keyid != keyid || memcmp(hk->idfp, idfp, FP64_SIZE+1))
Con_Printf("Server %s tried to change the host key to a value not in the host cache. Connecting to it will fail. To accept the new host key, do crypto_hostkey_clear %s\n", buf, buf);
if(hk->aeslevel > aeslevel)
Con_Printf("Server %s tried to reduce encryption status, not accepted. Connecting to it will fail. To accept, do crypto_hostkey_clear %s\n", buf, buf);
}
hk->aeslevel = max(aeslevel, hk->aeslevel);
return;
}
// great, we did NOT have it yet
hk = (crypto_storedhostkey_t *) Z_Malloc(sizeof(*hk));
memcpy(&hk->addr, peeraddress, sizeof(hk->addr));
hk->keyid = keyid;
memcpy(hk->idfp, idfp, FP64_SIZE+1);
hk->next = crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[hashindex];
hk->aeslevel = aeslevel;
crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[hashindex] = hk;
}
qboolean Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, int *keyid, char *keyfp, size_t keyfplen, char *idfp, size_t idfplen, int *aeslevel)
{
char buf[128];
int hashindex;
crypto_storedhostkey_t *hk;
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return false;
LHNETADDRESS_ToString(peeraddress, buf, sizeof(buf), 1);
hashindex = CRC_Block((const unsigned char *) buf, strlen(buf)) % CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE;
for(hk = crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[hashindex]; hk && LHNETADDRESS_Compare(&hk->addr, peeraddress); hk = hk->next);
if(!hk)
return false;
if(keyid)
*keyid = hk->keyid;
if(keyfp)
strlcpy(keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[hk->keyid], keyfplen);
if(idfp)
strlcpy(idfp, hk->idfp, idfplen);
if(aeslevel)
*aeslevel = hk->aeslevel;
return true;
}
int Crypto_RetrieveLocalKey(int keyid, char *keyfp, size_t keyfplen, char *idfp, size_t idfplen, qboolean *issigned) // return value: -1 if more to come, +1 if valid, 0 if end of list
{
if(keyid < 0 || keyid >= MAX_PUBKEYS)
return 0;
if(keyfp)
*keyfp = 0;
if(idfp)
*idfp = 0;
if(!pubkeys[keyid])
return -1;
if(keyfp)
strlcpy(keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[keyid], keyfplen);
if(idfp)
if(pubkeys_havepriv[keyid])
strlcpy(idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[keyid], keyfplen);
if(issigned)
*issigned = pubkeys_havesig[keyid];
return 1;
}
// end
// init/shutdown code
static void Crypto_BuildChallengeAppend(void)
{
char *p, *lengthptr, *startptr;
size_t n;
int i;
p = challenge_append;
n = sizeof(challenge_append);
Crypto_UnLittleLong(p, PROTOCOL_VLEN);
p += 4;
n -= 4;
lengthptr = p;
Crypto_UnLittleLong(p, 0);
p += 4;
n -= 4;
Crypto_UnLittleLong(p, PROTOCOL_D0_BLIND_ID);
p += 4;
n -= 4;
startptr = p;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
if(pubkeys_havepriv[i])
PutWithNul(&p, &n, pubkeys_fp64[i]);
PutWithNul(&p, &n, "");
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
if(!pubkeys_havepriv[i] && pubkeys[i])
PutWithNul(&p, &n, pubkeys_fp64[i]);
Crypto_UnLittleLong(lengthptr, p - startptr);
challenge_append_length = p - challenge_append;
}
static qboolean Crypto_SavePubKeyTextFile(int i)
{
qfile_t *f;
char vabuf[1024];
if(!pubkeys_havepriv[i])
return false;
f = FS_SysOpen(va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "%skey_%d-public-fp%s.txt", *fs_userdir ? fs_userdir : fs_basedir, i, sessionid.string), "w", false);
if(!f)
return false;
// we ignore errors for this file, as it's not necessary to have
FS_Printf(f, "ID-Fingerprint: %s\n", pubkeys_priv_fp64[i]);
FS_Printf(f, "ID-Is-Signed: %s\n", pubkeys_havesig[i] ? "yes" : "no");
FS_Printf(f, "ID-Is-For-Key: %s\n", pubkeys_fp64[i]);
FS_Printf(f, "\n");
FS_Printf(f, "This is a PUBLIC ID file for DarkPlaces.\n");
FS_Printf(f, "You are free to share this file or its contents.\n");
FS_Printf(f, "\n");
FS_Printf(f, "This file will be automatically generated again if deleted.\n");
FS_Printf(f, "\n");
FS_Printf(f, "However, NEVER share the accompanying SECRET ID file called\n");
FS_Printf(f, "key_%d.d0si%s, as doing so would compromise security!\n", i, sessionid.string);
FS_Close(f);
return true;
}
void Crypto_LoadKeys(void)
{
char buf[8192];
size_t len, len2;
int i;
char vabuf[1024];
if(!d0_blind_id_dll) // don't if we can't
return;
if(crypto_idstring) // already loaded? then not
return;
Host_LockSession(); // we use the session ID here
// load keys
// note: we are just a CLIENT
// so we load:
// PUBLIC KEYS to accept (including modulus)
// PRIVATE KEY of user
crypto_idstring = NULL;
dpsnprintf(crypto_idstring_buf, sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf), "%d", d0_rijndael_dll ? crypto_aeslevel.integer : 0);
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
{
memset(pubkeys_fp64[i], 0, sizeof(pubkeys_fp64[i]));
memset(pubkeys_priv_fp64[i], 0, sizeof(pubkeys_fp64[i]));
pubkeys_havepriv[i] = false;
pubkeys_havesig[i] = false;
len = Crypto_LoadFile(va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "key_%d.d0pk", i), buf, sizeof(buf), false);
if((pubkeys[i] = Crypto_ReadPublicKey(buf, len)))
{
len2 = FP64_SIZE;
if(qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_key(pubkeys[i], pubkeys_fp64[i], &len2)) // keeps final NUL
{
Con_Printf("Loaded public key key_%d.d0pk (fingerprint: %s)\n", i, pubkeys_fp64[i]);
len = Crypto_LoadFile(va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "key_%d.d0si%s", i, sessionid.string), buf, sizeof(buf), true);
if(len)
{
if(Crypto_AddPrivateKey(pubkeys[i], buf, len))
{
len2 = FP64_SIZE;
if(qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id(pubkeys[i], pubkeys_priv_fp64[i], &len2)) // keeps final NUL
{
D0_BOOL status = 0;
Con_Printf("Loaded private ID key_%d.d0si%s for key_%d.d0pk (public key fingerprint: %s)\n", i, sessionid.string, i, pubkeys_priv_fp64[i]);
// verify the key we just loaded (just in case)
if(qd0_blind_id_verify_private_id(pubkeys[i]) && qd0_blind_id_verify_public_id(pubkeys[i], &status))
{
pubkeys_havepriv[i] = true;
strlcat(crypto_idstring_buf, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), " %s@%s", pubkeys_priv_fp64[i], pubkeys_fp64[i]), sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf));
// verify the key we just got (just in case)
if(status)
pubkeys_havesig[i] = true;
else
Con_Printf("NOTE: this ID has not yet been signed!\n");
Crypto_SavePubKeyTextFile(i);
}
else
{
Con_Printf("d0_blind_id_verify_private_id failed, this is not a valid key!\n");
qd0_blind_id_free(pubkeys[i]);
pubkeys[i] = NULL;
}
}
else
{
Con_Printf("d0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id failed\n");
qd0_blind_id_free(pubkeys[i]);
pubkeys[i] = NULL;
}
}
}
}
else
{
// can't really happen
qd0_blind_id_free(pubkeys[i]);
pubkeys[i] = NULL;
}
}
}
crypto_idstring = crypto_idstring_buf;
keygen_i = -1;
Crypto_BuildChallengeAppend();
// find a good prefix length for all the keys we know (yes, algorithm is not perfect yet, may yield too long prefix length)
crypto_keyfp_recommended_length = 0;
memset(buf+256, 0, MAX_PUBKEYS + MAX_PUBKEYS);
while(crypto_keyfp_recommended_length < FP64_SIZE)
{
memset(buf, 0, 256);
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
if(pubkeys[i])
{
if(!buf[256 + i])
++buf[(unsigned char) pubkeys_fp64[i][crypto_keyfp_recommended_length]];
if(pubkeys_havepriv[i])
if(!buf[256 + MAX_PUBKEYS + i])
++buf[(unsigned char) pubkeys_priv_fp64[i][crypto_keyfp_recommended_length]];
}
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
if(pubkeys[i])
{
if(!buf[256 + i])
if(buf[(unsigned char) pubkeys_fp64[i][crypto_keyfp_recommended_length]] < 2)
buf[256 + i] = 1;
if(pubkeys_havepriv[i])
if(!buf[256 + MAX_PUBKEYS + i])
if(buf[(unsigned char) pubkeys_priv_fp64[i][crypto_keyfp_recommended_length]] < 2)
buf[256 + MAX_PUBKEYS + i] = 1;
}
++crypto_keyfp_recommended_length;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
if(pubkeys[i])
{
if(!buf[256 + i])
break;
if(pubkeys_havepriv[i])
if(!buf[256 + MAX_PUBKEYS + i])
break;
}
if(i >= MAX_PUBKEYS)
break;
}
if(crypto_keyfp_recommended_length < 7)
crypto_keyfp_recommended_length = 7;
}
static void Crypto_UnloadKeys(void)
{
int i;
keygen_i = -1;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
{
if(pubkeys[i])
qd0_blind_id_free(pubkeys[i]);
pubkeys[i] = NULL;
pubkeys_havepriv[i] = false;
pubkeys_havesig[i] = false;
memset(pubkeys_fp64[i], 0, sizeof(pubkeys_fp64[i]));
memset(pubkeys_priv_fp64[i], 0, sizeof(pubkeys_fp64[i]));
challenge_append_length = 0;
}
crypto_idstring = NULL;
}
static mempool_t *cryptomempool;
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif
static void *Crypto_d0_malloc(size_t len)
{
return Mem_Alloc(cryptomempool, len);
}
static void Crypto_d0_free(void *p)
{
Mem_Free(p);
}
static void *Crypto_d0_createmutex(void)
{
return Thread_CreateMutex();
}
static void Crypto_d0_destroymutex(void *m)
{
Thread_DestroyMutex(m);
}
static int Crypto_d0_lockmutex(void *m)
{
return Thread_LockMutex(m);
}
static int Crypto_d0_unlockmutex(void *m)
{
return Thread_UnlockMutex(m);
}
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
void Crypto_Shutdown(void)
{
crypto_t *crypto;
int i;
Crypto_Rijndael_CloseLibrary();
if(d0_blind_id_dll)
{
// free memory
for(i = 0; i < MAX_CRYPTOCONNECTS; ++i)
{
crypto = &cryptoconnects[i].crypto;
CLEAR_CDATA;
}
memset(cryptoconnects, 0, sizeof(cryptoconnects));
crypto = &cls.crypto;
CLEAR_CDATA;
Crypto_UnloadKeys();
qd0_blind_id_SHUTDOWN();
Crypto_CloseLibrary();
}
Mem_FreePool(&cryptomempool);
}
void Crypto_Init(void)
{
cryptomempool = Mem_AllocPool("crypto", 0, NULL);
if(!Crypto_OpenLibrary())
return;
qd0_blind_id_setmallocfuncs(Crypto_d0_malloc, Crypto_d0_free);
if (Thread_HasThreads())
qd0_blind_id_setmutexfuncs(Crypto_d0_createmutex, Crypto_d0_destroymutex, Crypto_d0_lockmutex, Crypto_d0_unlockmutex);
if(!qd0_blind_id_INITIALIZE())
{
Crypto_Rijndael_CloseLibrary();
Crypto_CloseLibrary();
Con_Printf("libd0_blind_id initialization FAILED, cryptography support has been disabled\n");
return;
}
(void) Crypto_Rijndael_OpenLibrary(); // if this fails, it's uncritical
Crypto_InitHostKeys();
}
// end
qboolean Crypto_Available(void)
{
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return false;
return true;
}
// keygen code
static void Crypto_KeyGen_Finished(int code, size_t length_received, unsigned char *buffer, void *cbdata)
{
const char *p[1];
size_t l[1];
static char buf[8192];
static char buf2[8192];
size_t buf2size;
qfile_t *f = NULL;
D0_BOOL status;
char vabuf[1024];
SV_LockThreadMutex();
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
{
Con_Print("libd0_blind_id DLL not found, this command is inactive.\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
if(keygen_i >= MAX_PUBKEYS || !pubkeys[keygen_i])
{
Con_Printf("overflow of keygen_i\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
if(keygen_i < 0)
{
Con_Printf("Unexpected response from keygen server:\n");
Com_HexDumpToConsole(buffer, length_received);
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
if(!Crypto_ParsePack((const char *) buffer, length_received, FOURCC_D0IR, p, l, 1))
{
if(length_received >= 5 && Crypto_LittleLong((const char *) buffer) == FOURCC_D0ER)
{
Con_Printf("Error response from keygen server: %.*s\n", (int)(length_received - 5), buffer + 5);
}
else
{
Con_Printf("Invalid response from keygen server:\n");
Com_HexDumpToConsole(buffer, length_received);
}
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
if(!qd0_blind_id_finish_private_id_request(pubkeys[keygen_i], p[0], l[0]))
{
Con_Printf("d0_blind_id_finish_private_id_request failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
// verify the key we just got (just in case)
if(!qd0_blind_id_verify_public_id(pubkeys[keygen_i], &status) || !status)
{
Con_Printf("d0_blind_id_verify_public_id failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
// we have a valid key now!
// make the rest of crypto.c know that
Con_Printf("Received signature for private ID key_%d.d0pk (public key fingerprint: %s)\n", keygen_i, pubkeys_priv_fp64[keygen_i]);
pubkeys_havesig[keygen_i] = true;
// write the key to disk
p[0] = buf;
l[0] = sizeof(buf);
if(!qd0_blind_id_write_private_id(pubkeys[keygen_i], buf, &l[0]))
{
Con_Printf("d0_blind_id_write_private_id failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
if(!(buf2size = Crypto_UnParsePack(buf2, sizeof(buf2), FOURCC_D0SI, p, l, 1)))
{
Con_Printf("Crypto_UnParsePack failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
FS_CreatePath(va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "%skey_%d.d0si%s", *fs_userdir ? fs_userdir : fs_basedir, keygen_i, sessionid.string));
f = FS_SysOpen(va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "%skey_%d.d0si%s", *fs_userdir ? fs_userdir : fs_basedir, keygen_i, sessionid.string), "wb", false);
if(!f)
{
Con_Printf("Cannot open key_%d.d0si%s\n", keygen_i, sessionid.string);
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
FS_Write(f, buf2, buf2size);
FS_Close(f);
Crypto_SavePubKeyTextFile(keygen_i);
Con_Printf("Saved to key_%d.d0si%s\n", keygen_i, sessionid.string);
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
}
static void Crypto_KeyGen_f(void)
{
int i;
const char *p[1];
size_t l[1];
static char buf[8192];
static char buf2[8192];
size_t buf2size;
size_t buf2l, buf2pos;
char vabuf[1024];
size_t len2;
qfile_t *f = NULL;
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
{
Con_Print("libd0_blind_id DLL not found, this command is inactive.\n");
return;
}
if(Cmd_Argc() != 3)
{
Con_Printf("usage:\n%s id url\n", Cmd_Argv(0));
return;
}
SV_LockThreadMutex();
Crypto_LoadKeys();
i = atoi(Cmd_Argv(1));
if(!pubkeys[i])
{
Con_Printf("there is no public key %d\n", i);
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
if(keygen_i >= 0)
{
Con_Printf("there is already a keygen run on the way\n");
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
keygen_i = i;
// how to START the keygenning...
if(pubkeys_havepriv[keygen_i])
{
if(pubkeys_havesig[keygen_i])
{
Con_Printf("there is already a signed private key for %d\n", i);
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
// if we get here, we only need a signature, no new keygen run needed
Con_Printf("Only need a signature for an existing key...\n");
}
else
{
// we also need a new ID itself
if(!qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_start(pubkeys[keygen_i]))
{
Con_Printf("d0_blind_id_start failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
// verify the key we just got (just in case)
if(!qd0_blind_id_verify_private_id(pubkeys[keygen_i]))
{
Con_Printf("d0_blind_id_verify_private_id failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
// we have a valid key now!
// make the rest of crypto.c know that
len2 = FP64_SIZE;
if(qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id(pubkeys[keygen_i], pubkeys_priv_fp64[keygen_i], &len2)) // keeps final NUL
{
Con_Printf("Generated private ID key_%d.d0pk (public key fingerprint: %s)\n", keygen_i, pubkeys_priv_fp64[keygen_i]);
pubkeys_havepriv[keygen_i] = true;
strlcat(crypto_idstring_buf, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), " %s@%s", pubkeys_priv_fp64[keygen_i], pubkeys_fp64[keygen_i]), sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf));
crypto_idstring = crypto_idstring_buf;
Crypto_BuildChallengeAppend();
}
// write the key to disk
p[0] = buf;
l[0] = sizeof(buf);
if(!qd0_blind_id_write_private_id(pubkeys[keygen_i], buf, &l[0]))
{
Con_Printf("d0_blind_id_write_private_id failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
if(!(buf2size = Crypto_UnParsePack(buf2, sizeof(buf2), FOURCC_D0SI, p, l, 1)))
{
Con_Printf("Crypto_UnParsePack failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
FS_CreatePath(va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "%skey_%d.d0si%s", *fs_userdir ? fs_userdir : fs_basedir, keygen_i, sessionid.string));
f = FS_SysOpen(va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "%skey_%d.d0si%s", *fs_userdir ? fs_userdir : fs_basedir, keygen_i, sessionid.string), "wb", false);
if(!f)
{
Con_Printf("Cannot open key_%d.d0si%s\n", keygen_i, sessionid.string);
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
FS_Write(f, buf2, buf2size);
FS_Close(f);
Crypto_SavePubKeyTextFile(keygen_i);
Con_Printf("Saved unsigned key to key_%d.d0si%s\n", keygen_i, sessionid.string);
}
p[0] = buf;
l[0] = sizeof(buf);
if(!qd0_blind_id_generate_private_id_request(pubkeys[keygen_i], buf, &l[0]))
{
Con_Printf("d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_request failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
buf2pos = strlen(Cmd_Argv(2));
memcpy(buf2, Cmd_Argv(2), buf2pos);
if(!(buf2l = Crypto_UnParsePack(buf2 + buf2pos, sizeof(buf2) - buf2pos - 1, FOURCC_D0IQ, p, l, 1)))
{
Con_Printf("Crypto_UnParsePack failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
if(!(buf2l = base64_encode((unsigned char *) (buf2 + buf2pos), buf2l, sizeof(buf2) - buf2pos - 1)))
{
Con_Printf("base64_encode failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
buf2l += buf2pos;
buf2[buf2l] = 0;
if(!Curl_Begin_ToMemory(buf2, 0, (unsigned char *) keygen_buf, sizeof(keygen_buf), Crypto_KeyGen_Finished, NULL))
{
Con_Printf("curl failed\n");
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
Con_Printf("Signature generation in progress...\n");
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
}
// end
// console commands
static void Crypto_Reload_f(void)
{
Crypto_ClearHostKeys();
Crypto_UnloadKeys();
Crypto_LoadKeys();
}
static void Crypto_Keys_f(void)
{
int i;
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
{
Con_Print("libd0_blind_id DLL not found, this command is inactive.\n");
return;
}
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
{
if(pubkeys[i])
{
Con_Printf("%2d: public key key_%d.d0pk (fingerprint: %s)\n", i, i, pubkeys_fp64[i]);
if(pubkeys_havepriv[i])
{
Con_Printf(" private ID key_%d.d0si%s (public key fingerprint: %s)\n", i, sessionid.string, pubkeys_priv_fp64[i]);
if(!pubkeys_havesig[i])
Con_Printf(" NOTE: this ID has not yet been signed!\n");
}
}
}
}
static void Crypto_HostKeys_f(void)
{
int i;
crypto_storedhostkey_t *hk;
char buf[128];
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
{
Con_Print("libd0_blind_id DLL not found, this command is inactive.\n");
return;
}
for(i = 0; i < CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE; ++i)
{
for(hk = crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[i]; hk; hk = hk->next)
{
LHNETADDRESS_ToString(&hk->addr, buf, sizeof(buf), 1);
Con_Printf("%d %s@%.*s %s\n",
hk->aeslevel,
hk->idfp,
crypto_keyfp_recommended_length, pubkeys_fp64[hk->keyid],
buf);
}
}
}
static void Crypto_HostKey_Clear_f(void)
{
lhnetaddress_t addr;
int i;
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
{
Con_Print("libd0_blind_id DLL not found, this command is inactive.\n");
return;
}
for(i = 1; i < Cmd_Argc(); ++i)
{
LHNETADDRESS_FromString(&addr, Cmd_Argv(i), 26000);
if(Crypto_ClearHostKey(&addr))
{
Con_Printf("cleared host key for %s\n", Cmd_Argv(i));
}
}
}
void Crypto_Init_Commands(void)
{
if(d0_blind_id_dll)
{
Cmd_AddCommand("crypto_reload", Crypto_Reload_f, "reloads cryptographic keys");
Cmd_AddCommand("crypto_keygen", Crypto_KeyGen_f, "generates and saves a cryptographic key");
Cmd_AddCommand("crypto_keys", Crypto_Keys_f, "lists the loaded keys");
Cmd_AddCommand("crypto_hostkeys", Crypto_HostKeys_f, "lists the cached host keys");
Cmd_AddCommand("crypto_hostkey_clear", Crypto_HostKey_Clear_f, "clears a cached host key");
Cvar_RegisterVariable(&crypto_developer);
if(d0_rijndael_dll)
Cvar_RegisterVariable(&crypto_aeslevel);
else
crypto_aeslevel.integer = 0; // make sure
Cvar_RegisterVariable(&crypto_servercpupercent);
Cvar_RegisterVariable(&crypto_servercpumaxtime);
Cvar_RegisterVariable(&crypto_servercpudebug);
}
}
// end
// AES encryption
static void aescpy(unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *dst, const unsigned char *src, size_t len)
{
const unsigned char *xorpos = iv;
unsigned char xorbuf[16];
unsigned long rk[D0_RIJNDAEL_RKLENGTH(DHKEY_SIZE * 8)];
size_t i;
qd0_rijndael_setup_encrypt(rk, key, DHKEY_SIZE * 8);
while(len > 16)
{
for(i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
xorbuf[i] = src[i] ^ xorpos[i];
qd0_rijndael_encrypt(rk, D0_RIJNDAEL_NROUNDS(DHKEY_SIZE * 8), xorbuf, dst);
xorpos = dst;
len -= 16;
src += 16;
dst += 16;
}
if(len > 0)
{
for(i = 0; i < len; ++i)
xorbuf[i] = src[i] ^ xorpos[i];
for(; i < 16; ++i)
xorbuf[i] = xorpos[i];
qd0_rijndael_encrypt(rk, D0_RIJNDAEL_NROUNDS(DHKEY_SIZE * 8), xorbuf, dst);
}
}
static void seacpy(unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *dst, const unsigned char *src, size_t len)
{
const unsigned char *xorpos = iv;
unsigned char xorbuf[16];
unsigned long rk[D0_RIJNDAEL_RKLENGTH(DHKEY_SIZE * 8)];
size_t i;
qd0_rijndael_setup_decrypt(rk, key, DHKEY_SIZE * 8);
while(len > 16)
{
qd0_rijndael_decrypt(rk, D0_RIJNDAEL_NROUNDS(DHKEY_SIZE * 8), src, xorbuf);
for(i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
dst[i] = xorbuf[i] ^ xorpos[i];
xorpos = src;
len -= 16;
src += 16;
dst += 16;
}
if(len > 0)
{
qd0_rijndael_decrypt(rk, D0_RIJNDAEL_NROUNDS(DHKEY_SIZE * 8), src, xorbuf);
for(i = 0; i < len; ++i)
dst[i] = xorbuf[i] ^ xorpos[i];
}
}
// NOTE: we MUST avoid the following begins of the packet:
// 1. 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
// 2. 0x80, 0x00, length/256, length%256
// this luckily does NOT affect AES mode, where the first byte always is in the range from 0x00 to 0x0F
const void *Crypto_EncryptPacket(crypto_t *crypto, const void *data_src, size_t len_src, void *data_dst, size_t *len_dst, size_t len)
{
unsigned char h[32];
int i;
if(crypto->authenticated)
{
if(crypto->use_aes)
{
// AES packet = 1 byte length overhead, 15 bytes from HMAC-SHA-256, data, 0..15 bytes padding
// 15 bytes HMAC-SHA-256 (112bit) suffice as the attacker can't do more than forge a random-looking packet
// HMAC is needed to not leak information about packet content
if(developer_networking.integer)
{
Con_Print("To be encrypted:\n");
Com_HexDumpToConsole((const unsigned char *) data_src, len_src);
}
if(len_src + 32 > len || !HMAC_SHA256_32BYTES(h, (const unsigned char *) data_src, len_src, crypto->dhkey, DHKEY_SIZE))
{
Con_Printf("Crypto_EncryptPacket failed (not enough space: %d bytes in, %d bytes out)\n", (int) len_src, (int) len);
return NULL;
}
*len_dst = ((len_src + 15) / 16) * 16 + 16; // add 16 for HMAC, then round to 16-size for AES
((unsigned char *) data_dst)[0] = *len_dst - len_src;
memcpy(((unsigned char *) data_dst)+1, h, 15);
aescpy(crypto->dhkey, (const unsigned char *) data_dst, ((unsigned char *) data_dst) + 16, (const unsigned char *) data_src, len_src);
// IV dst src len
}
else
{
// HMAC packet = 16 bytes HMAC-SHA-256 (truncated to 128 bits), data
if(len_src + 16 > len || !HMAC_SHA256_32BYTES(h, (const unsigned char *) data_src, len_src, crypto->dhkey, DHKEY_SIZE))
{
Con_Printf("Crypto_EncryptPacket failed (not enough space: %d bytes in, %d bytes out)\n", (int) len_src, (int) len);
return NULL;
}
*len_dst = len_src + 16;
memcpy(data_dst, h, 16);
memcpy(((unsigned char *) data_dst) + 16, (unsigned char *) data_src, len_src);
// handle the "avoid" conditions:
i = BuffBigLong((unsigned char *) data_dst);
if(
(i == (int)0xFFFFFFFF) // avoid QW control packet
||
(i == (int)0x80000000 + (int)*len_dst) // avoid NQ control packet
)
*(unsigned char *)data_dst ^= 0x80; // this will ALWAYS fix it
}
return data_dst;
}
else
{
*len_dst = len_src;
return data_src;
}
}
const void *Crypto_DecryptPacket(crypto_t *crypto, const void *data_src, size_t len_src, void *data_dst, size_t *len_dst, size_t len)
{
unsigned char h[32];
int i;
// silently handle non-crypto packets
i = BuffBigLong((unsigned char *) data_src);
if(
(i == (int)0xFFFFFFFF) // avoid QW control packet
||
(i == (int)0x80000000 + (int)len_src) // avoid NQ control packet
)
return NULL;
if(crypto->authenticated)
{
if(crypto->use_aes)
{
if(len_src < 16 || ((len_src - 16) % 16))
{
Con_Printf("Crypto_DecryptPacket failed (not enough space: %d bytes in, %d bytes out)\n", (int) len_src, (int) len);
return NULL;
}
*len_dst = len_src - ((unsigned char *) data_src)[0];
if(len < *len_dst || *len_dst > len_src - 16)
{
Con_Printf("Crypto_DecryptPacket failed (not enough space: %d bytes in, %d->%d bytes out)\n", (int) len_src, (int) *len_dst, (int) len);
return NULL;
}
seacpy(crypto->dhkey, (unsigned char *) data_src, (unsigned char *) data_dst, ((const unsigned char *) data_src) + 16, *len_dst);
// IV dst src len
if(!HMAC_SHA256_32BYTES(h, (const unsigned char *) data_dst, *len_dst, crypto->dhkey, DHKEY_SIZE))
{
Con_Printf("HMAC fail\n");
return NULL;
}
if(memcmp(((const unsigned char *) data_src)+1, h, 15)) // ignore first byte, used for length
{
Con_Printf("HMAC mismatch\n");
return NULL;
}
if(developer_networking.integer)
{
Con_Print("Decrypted:\n");
Com_HexDumpToConsole((const unsigned char *) data_dst, *len_dst);
}
return data_dst; // no need to copy
}
else
{
if(len_src < 16)
{
Con_Printf("Crypto_DecryptPacket failed (not enough space: %d bytes in, %d bytes out)\n", (int) len_src, (int) len);
return NULL;
}
*len_dst = len_src - 16;
if(len < *len_dst)
{
Con_Printf("Crypto_DecryptPacket failed (not enough space: %d bytes in, %d->%d bytes out)\n", (int) len_src, (int) *len_dst, (int) len);
return NULL;
}
//memcpy(data_dst, data_src + 16, *len_dst);
if(!HMAC_SHA256_32BYTES(h, ((const unsigned char *) data_src) + 16, *len_dst, crypto->dhkey, DHKEY_SIZE))
{
Con_Printf("HMAC fail\n");
Com_HexDumpToConsole((const unsigned char *) data_src, len_src);
return NULL;
}
if(memcmp((const unsigned char *) data_src, h, 16)) // ignore first byte, used for length
{
// undo the "avoid conditions"
if(
(i == (int)0x7FFFFFFF) // avoided QW control packet
||
(i == (int)0x00000000 + (int)len_src) // avoided NQ control packet
)
{
// do the avoidance on the hash too
h[0] ^= 0x80;
if(memcmp((const unsigned char *) data_src, h, 16)) // ignore first byte, used for length
{
Con_Printf("HMAC mismatch\n");
Com_HexDumpToConsole((const unsigned char *) data_src, len_src);
return NULL;
}
}
else
{
Con_Printf("HMAC mismatch\n");
Com_HexDumpToConsole((const unsigned char *) data_src, len_src);
return NULL;
}
}
return ((const unsigned char *) data_src) + 16; // no need to copy, so data_dst is not used
}
}
else
{
*len_dst = len_src;
return data_src;
}
}
// end
const char *Crypto_GetInfoResponseDataString(void)
{
crypto_idstring_buf[0] = '0' + crypto_aeslevel.integer;
return crypto_idstring;
}
// network protocol
qboolean Crypto_ServerAppendToChallenge(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, size_t maxlen_out)
{
// cheap op, all is precomputed
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return false; // no support
// append challenge
if(maxlen_out <= *len_out + challenge_append_length)
return false;
memcpy(data_out + *len_out, challenge_append, challenge_append_length);
*len_out += challenge_append_length;
return false;
}
static int Crypto_ServerError(char *data_out, size_t *len_out, const char *msg, const char *msg_client)
{
if(!msg_client)
msg_client = msg;
Con_DPrintf("rejecting client: %s\n", msg);
if(*msg_client)
dpsnprintf(data_out, *len_out, "reject %s", msg_client);
*len_out = strlen(data_out);
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
static int Crypto_SoftServerError(char *data_out, size_t *len_out, const char *msg)
{
*len_out = 0;
Con_DPrintf("%s\n", msg);
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
static int Crypto_ServerParsePacket_Internal(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
{
// if "connect": reject if in the middle of crypto handshake
crypto_t *crypto = NULL;
char *data_out_p = data_out;
const char *string = data_in;
int aeslevel;
D0_BOOL aes;
D0_BOOL status;
char infostringvalue[MAX_INPUTLINE];
char vabuf[1024];
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH; // no support
if (len_in > 8 && !memcmp(string, "connect\\", 8) && d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3)
{
const char *s;
int i;
// sorry, we have to verify the challenge here to not reflect network spam
if (!(s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "challenge", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH; // will be later accepted if encryption was set up
// validate the challenge
for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
if(challenge[i].time > 0)
if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strcmp(challenge[i].string, s))
break;
// if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES) // challenge mismatch is silent
return CRYPTO_DISCARD; // pre-challenge: rather be silent
crypto = Crypto_ServerFindInstance(peeraddress, false);
if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated)
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires authentication and encryption to be supported by your client", NULL);
}
else if(len_in > 5 && !memcmp(string, "d0pk\\", 5) && ((LHNETADDRESS_GetAddressType(peeraddress) == LHNETADDRESSTYPE_LOOP) || sv_public.integer > -3))
{
const char *cnt, *s, *p;
int id;
int clientid = -1, serverid = -1;
cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
id = (cnt ? atoi(cnt) : -1);
cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
if(!cnt)
return CRYPTO_DISCARD; // pre-challenge: rather be silent
GetUntilNul(&data_in, &len_in);
if(!data_in)
return CRYPTO_DISCARD; // pre-challenge: rather be silent
if(!strcmp(cnt, "0"))
{
int i;
if (!(s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "challenge", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
return CRYPTO_DISCARD; // pre-challenge: rather be silent
// validate the challenge
for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
if(challenge[i].time > 0)
if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strcmp(challenge[i].string, s))
break;
// if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES) // challenge mismatch is silent
return CRYPTO_DISCARD; // pre-challenge: rather be silent
if (!(s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aeslevel", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
aeslevel = 0; // not supported
else
aeslevel = bound(0, atoi(s), 3);
switch(bound(0, d0_rijndael_dll ? crypto_aeslevel.integer : 0, 3))
{
default: // dummy, never happens, but to make gcc happy...
case 0:
if(aeslevel >= 3)
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)", NULL);
aes = false;
break;
case 1:
aes = (aeslevel >= 2);
break;
case 2:
aes = (aeslevel >= 1);
break;
case 3:
if(aeslevel <= 0)
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be supported (crypto_aeslevel >= 1, and d0_rijndael library must be present)", NULL);
aes = true;
break;
}
p = GetUntilNul(&data_in, &len_in);
if(p && *p)
{
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
{
if(pubkeys[i])
if(!strcmp(p, pubkeys_fp64[i]))
if(pubkeys_havepriv[i])
if(serverid < 0)
serverid = i;
}
if(serverid < 0)
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "Invalid server key", NULL);
}
p = GetUntilNul(&data_in, &len_in);
if(p && *p)
{
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
{
if(pubkeys[i])
if(!strcmp(p, pubkeys_fp64[i]))
if(clientid < 0)
clientid = i;
}
if(clientid < 0)
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "Invalid client key", NULL);
}
crypto = Crypto_ServerFindInstance(peeraddress, true);
if(!crypto)
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "Could not create a crypto connect instance", NULL);
MAKE_CDATA;
CDATA->cdata_id = id;
CDATA->s = serverid;
CDATA->c = clientid;
memset(crypto->dhkey, 0, sizeof(crypto->dhkey));
CDATA->challenge[0] = 0;
crypto->client_keyfp[0] = 0;
crypto->client_idfp[0] = 0;
crypto->server_keyfp[0] = 0;
crypto->server_idfp[0] = 0;
crypto->use_aes = aes != 0;
if(CDATA->s >= 0)
{
// I am the server, and my key is ok... so let's set server_keyfp and server_idfp
strlcpy(crypto->server_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_keyfp));
strlcpy(crypto->server_idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_idfp));
if(!CDATA->id)
CDATA->id = qd0_blind_id_new();
if(!CDATA->id)
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_new failed", "Internal error");
}
if(!qd0_blind_id_copy(CDATA->id, pubkeys[CDATA->s]))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_copy failed", "Internal error");
}
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "d0pk\\cnt\\1\\id\\%d\\aes\\%d", CDATA->cdata_id, crypto->use_aes));
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start(CDATA->id, true, false, "XONOTIC", 8, data_out_p, len_out)) // len_out receives used size by this op
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start failed", "Internal error");
}
CDATA->next_step = 2;
data_out_p += *len_out;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
else if(CDATA->c >= 0)
{
if(!CDATA->id)
CDATA->id = qd0_blind_id_new();
if(!CDATA->id)
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_new failed", "Internal error");
}
if(!qd0_blind_id_copy(CDATA->id, pubkeys[CDATA->c]))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_copy failed", "Internal error");
}
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "d0pk\\cnt\\5\\id\\%d\\aes\\%d", CDATA->cdata_id, crypto->use_aes));
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge(CDATA->id, true, false, data_in, len_in, data_out_p, len_out, &status))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge failed", "Internal error");
}
CDATA->next_step = 6;
data_out_p += *len_out;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
else
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "Missing client and server key", NULL);
}
}
else if(!strcmp(cnt, "2"))
{
size_t fpbuflen;
crypto = Crypto_ServerFindInstance(peeraddress, false);
if(!crypto)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH; // pre-challenge, rather be silent
if(id >= 0)
if(CDATA->cdata_id != id)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
if(CDATA->next_step != 2)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "d0pk\\cnt\\3\\id\\%d", CDATA->cdata_id));
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_response(CDATA->id, data_in, len_in, data_out_p, len_out))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_response failed", "Internal error");
}
fpbuflen = DHKEY_SIZE;
if(!qd0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id(CDATA->id, (char *) crypto->dhkey, &fpbuflen))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id failed", "Internal error");
}
if(CDATA->c >= 0)
{
if(!qd0_blind_id_copy(CDATA->id, pubkeys[CDATA->c]))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_copy failed", "Internal error");
}
CDATA->next_step = 4;
}
else
{
// session key is FINISHED (no server part is to be expected)! By this, all keys are set up
crypto->authenticated = true;
CDATA->next_step = 0;
}
data_out_p += *len_out;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
else if(!strcmp(cnt, "4"))
{
crypto = Crypto_ServerFindInstance(peeraddress, false);
if(!crypto)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH; // pre-challenge, rather be silent
if(id >= 0)
if(CDATA->cdata_id != id)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
if(CDATA->next_step != 4)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "d0pk\\cnt\\5\\id\\%d", CDATA->cdata_id));
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge(CDATA->id, true, false, data_in, len_in, data_out_p, len_out, &status))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge failed", "Internal error");
}
CDATA->next_step = 6;
data_out_p += *len_out;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
else if(!strcmp(cnt, "6"))
{
static char msgbuf[32];
size_t msgbuflen = sizeof(msgbuf);
size_t fpbuflen;
int i;
unsigned char dhkey[DHKEY_SIZE];
crypto = Crypto_ServerFindInstance(peeraddress, false);
if(!crypto)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH; // pre-challenge, rather be silent
if(id >= 0)
if(CDATA->cdata_id != id)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
if(CDATA->next_step != 6)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify(CDATA->id, data_in, len_in, msgbuf, &msgbuflen, &status))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify failed (authentication error)", "Authentication error");
}
if(status)
strlcpy(crypto->client_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_keyfp));
else
crypto->client_keyfp[0] = 0;
memset(crypto->client_idfp, 0, sizeof(crypto->client_idfp));
fpbuflen = FP64_SIZE;
if(!qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id(CDATA->id, crypto->client_idfp, &fpbuflen))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id failed", "Internal error");
}
fpbuflen = DHKEY_SIZE;
if(!qd0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id(CDATA->id, (char *) dhkey, &fpbuflen))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id failed", "Internal error");
}
// XOR the two DH keys together to make one
for(i = 0; i < DHKEY_SIZE; ++i)
crypto->dhkey[i] ^= dhkey[i];
// session key is FINISHED (no server part is to be expected)! By this, all keys are set up
crypto->authenticated = true;
CDATA->next_step = 0;
// send a challenge-less challenge
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, "challenge ");
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
--*len_out; // remove NUL terminator
return CRYPTO_MATCH;
}
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH; // pre-challenge, rather be silent
}
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
}
int Crypto_ServerParsePacket(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
{
int ret;
double t = 0;
static double complain_time = 0;
const char *cnt;
qboolean do_time = false;
qboolean do_reject = false;
char infostringvalue[MAX_INPUTLINE];
if(crypto_servercpupercent.value > 0 || crypto_servercpumaxtime.value > 0)
if(len_in > 5 && !memcmp(data_in, "d0pk\\", 5))
{
do_time = true;
cnt = InfoString_GetValue(data_in + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
if(cnt)
if(!strcmp(cnt, "0"))
do_reject = true;
}
if(do_time)
{
// check if we may perform crypto...
if(crypto_servercpupercent.value > 0)
{
crypto_servercpu_accumulator += (realtime - crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime) * crypto_servercpupercent.value * 0.01;
if(crypto_servercpumaxtime.value)
if(crypto_servercpu_accumulator > crypto_servercpumaxtime.value)
crypto_servercpu_accumulator = crypto_servercpumaxtime.value;
}
else
{
if(crypto_servercpumaxtime.value > 0)
if(realtime != crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime)
crypto_servercpu_accumulator = crypto_servercpumaxtime.value;
}
crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime = realtime;
if(do_reject && crypto_servercpu_accumulator < 0)
{
if(realtime > complain_time + 5)
Con_Printf("crypto: cannot perform requested crypto operations; denial service attack or crypto_servercpupercent/crypto_servercpumaxtime are too low\n");
*len_out = 0;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
t = Sys_DirtyTime();
}
ret = Crypto_ServerParsePacket_Internal(data_in, len_in, data_out, len_out, peeraddress);
if(do_time)
{
t = Sys_DirtyTime() - t;if (t < 0.0) t = 0.0; // dirtytime can step backwards
if(crypto_servercpudebug.integer)
Con_Printf("crypto: accumulator was %.1f ms, used %.1f ms for crypto, ", crypto_servercpu_accumulator * 1000, t * 1000);
crypto_servercpu_accumulator -= t;
if(crypto_servercpudebug.integer)
Con_Printf("is %.1f ms\n", crypto_servercpu_accumulator * 1000);
}
return ret;
}
static int Crypto_ClientError(char *data_out, size_t *len_out, const char *msg)
{
dpsnprintf(data_out, *len_out, "reject %s", msg);
*len_out = strlen(data_out);
return CRYPTO_REPLACE;
}
static int Crypto_SoftClientError(char *data_out, size_t *len_out, const char *msg)
{
*len_out = 0;
Con_Printf("%s\n", msg);
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
int Crypto_ClientParsePacket(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
{
crypto_t *crypto = &cls.crypto;
const char *string = data_in;
const char *s;
D0_BOOL aes;
char *data_out_p = data_out;
D0_BOOL status;
char infostringvalue[MAX_INPUTLINE];
char vabuf[1024];
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH; // no support
// if "challenge": verify challenge, and discard message, send next crypto protocol message instead
// otherwise, just handle actual protocol messages
if (len_in == 6 && !memcmp(string, "accept", 6) && cls.connect_trying && d0_rijndael_dll)
{
int wantserverid = -1;
Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated) // we ALSO get here if we are using an encrypted connection, so let's rule this out
{
if(wantserverid >= 0)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server tried an unauthenticated connection even though a host key is present");
if(crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)");
}
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
}
else if (len_in >= 1 && string[0] == 'j' && cls.connect_trying && d0_rijndael_dll)
{
int wantserverid = -1;
Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
//if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated)
{
if(wantserverid >= 0)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server tried an unauthenticated connection even though a host key is present");
if(crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)");
}
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
}
else if (len_in >= 5 && BuffLittleLong((unsigned char *) string) == ((int)NETFLAG_CTL | (int)len_in))
{
int wantserverid = -1;
// these three are harmless
if(string[4] == CCREP_SERVER_INFO)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
if(string[4] == CCREP_PLAYER_INFO)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
if(string[4] == CCREP_RULE_INFO)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
//if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated)
{
if(wantserverid >= 0)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server tried an unauthenticated connection even though a host key is present");
if(crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)");
}
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
}
else if (len_in >= 13 && !memcmp(string, "infoResponse\x0A", 13))
{
s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 13, "d0_blind_id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
if(s)
Crypto_StoreHostKey(peeraddress, s, true);
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
}
else if (len_in >= 15 && !memcmp(string, "statusResponse\x0A", 15))
{
char save = 0;
const char *p;
p = strchr(string + 15, '\n');
if(p)
{
save = *p;
* (char *) p = 0; // cut off the string there
}
s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 15, "d0_blind_id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
if(s)
Crypto_StoreHostKey(peeraddress, s, true);
if(p)
{
* (char *) p = save;
// invoking those nasal demons again (do not run this on the DS9k)
}
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
}
else if(len_in > 10 && !memcmp(string, "challenge ", 10) && cls.connect_trying)
{
const char *vlen_blind_id_ptr = NULL;
size_t len_blind_id_ptr = 0;
unsigned long k, v;
const char *challenge = data_in + 10;
const char *p;
int i;
int clientid = -1, serverid = -1, wantserverid = -1;
qboolean server_can_auth = true;
char wantserver_idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
int wantserver_aeslevel = 0;
// if we have a stored host key for the server, assume serverid to already be selected!
// (the loop will refuse to overwrite this one then)
wantserver_idfp[0] = 0;
Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, wantserver_idfp, sizeof(wantserver_idfp), &wantserver_aeslevel);
// requirement: wantserver_idfp is a full ID if wantserverid set
// if we leave, we have to consider the connection
// unauthenticated; NOTE: this may be faked by a clever
// attacker to force an unauthenticated connection; so we have
// a safeguard check in place when encryption is required too
// in place, or when authentication is required by the server
crypto->authenticated = false;
GetUntilNul(&data_in, &len_in);
if(!data_in)
return (wantserverid >= 0) ? Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server tried an unauthenticated connection even though a host key is present") :
(d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3) ? Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)", NULL) :
CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
// FTEQW extension protocol
while(len_in >= 8)
{
k = Crypto_LittleLong(data_in);
v = Crypto_LittleLong(data_in + 4);
data_in += 8;
len_in -= 8;
switch(k)
{
case PROTOCOL_VLEN:
if(len_in >= 4 + v)
{
k = Crypto_LittleLong(data_in);
data_in += 4;
len_in -= 4;
switch(k)
{
case PROTOCOL_D0_BLIND_ID:
vlen_blind_id_ptr = data_in;
len_blind_id_ptr = v;
break;
}
data_in += v;
len_in -= v;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if(!vlen_blind_id_ptr)
return (wantserverid >= 0) ? Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server tried an unauthenticated connection even though authentication is required") :
(d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3) ? Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)", NULL) :
CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
data_in = vlen_blind_id_ptr;
len_in = len_blind_id_ptr;
// parse fingerprints
// once we found a fingerprint we can auth to (ANY), select it as clientfp
// once we found a fingerprint in the first list that we know, select it as serverfp
for(;;)
{
p = GetUntilNul(&data_in, &len_in);
if(!p)
break;
if(!*p)
{
if(!server_can_auth)
break; // other protocol message may follow
server_can_auth = false;
if(clientid >= 0)
break;
continue;
}
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
{
if(pubkeys[i])
if(!strcmp(p, pubkeys_fp64[i]))
{
if(pubkeys_havepriv[i])
if(clientid < 0)
clientid = i;
if(server_can_auth)
if(serverid < 0)
if(wantserverid < 0 || i == wantserverid)
serverid = i;
}
}
if(clientid >= 0 && serverid >= 0)
break;
}
// if stored host key is not found:
if(wantserverid >= 0 && serverid < 0)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server CA does not match stored host key, refusing to connect");
if(serverid >= 0 || clientid >= 0)
{
// TODO at this point, fill clientside crypto struct!
MAKE_CDATA;
CDATA->cdata_id = ++cdata_id;
CDATA->s = serverid;
CDATA->c = clientid;
memset(crypto->dhkey, 0, sizeof(crypto->dhkey));
strlcpy(CDATA->challenge, challenge, sizeof(CDATA->challenge));
crypto->client_keyfp[0] = 0;
crypto->client_idfp[0] = 0;
crypto->server_keyfp[0] = 0;
crypto->server_idfp[0] = 0;
memcpy(CDATA->wantserver_idfp, wantserver_idfp, sizeof(crypto->server_idfp));
if(CDATA->wantserver_idfp[0]) // if we know a host key, honor its encryption setting
switch(bound(0, d0_rijndael_dll ? crypto_aeslevel.integer : 0, 3))
{
default: // dummy, never happens, but to make gcc happy...
case 0:
if(wantserver_aeslevel >= 3)
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)", NULL);
CDATA->wantserver_aes = false;
break;
case 1:
CDATA->wantserver_aes = (wantserver_aeslevel >= 2);
break;
case 2:
CDATA->wantserver_aes = (wantserver_aeslevel >= 1);
break;
case 3:
if(wantserver_aeslevel <= 0)
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be supported (crypto_aeslevel >= 1, and d0_rijndael library must be present)", NULL);
CDATA->wantserver_aes = true;
break;
}
// build outgoing message
// append regular stuff
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "d0pk\\cnt\\0\\id\\%d\\aeslevel\\%d\\challenge\\%s", CDATA->cdata_id, d0_rijndael_dll ? crypto_aeslevel.integer : 0, challenge));
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, serverid >= 0 ? pubkeys_fp64[serverid] : "");
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, clientid >= 0 ? pubkeys_fp64[clientid] : "");
if(clientid >= 0)
{
// I am the client, and my key is ok... so let's set client_keyfp and client_idfp
strlcpy(crypto->client_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_keyfp));
strlcpy(crypto->client_idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_idfp));
}
if(serverid >= 0)
{
if(!CDATA->id)
CDATA->id = qd0_blind_id_new();
if(!CDATA->id)
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_new failed");
}
if(!qd0_blind_id_copy(CDATA->id, pubkeys[CDATA->s]))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_copy failed");
}
CDATA->next_step = 1;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
}
else if(clientid >= 0)
{
// skip over server auth, perform client auth only
if(!CDATA->id)
CDATA->id = qd0_blind_id_new();
if(!CDATA->id)
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_new failed");
}
if(!qd0_blind_id_copy(CDATA->id, pubkeys[CDATA->c]))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_copy failed");
}
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start(CDATA->id, true, false, "XONOTIC", 8, data_out_p, len_out)) // len_out receives used size by this op
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start failed");
}
CDATA->next_step = 5;
data_out_p += *len_out;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
}
else
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
else
{
if(wantserver_idfp[0]) // if we know a host key, honor its encryption setting
if(wantserver_aeslevel >= 3)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server insists on encryption, but neither can authenticate to the other");
return (d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3) ? Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)", NULL) :
CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
}
}
else if(len_in > 5 && !memcmp(string, "d0pk\\", 5) && cls.connect_trying)
{
const char *cnt;
int id;
cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
id = (cnt ? atoi(cnt) : -1);
cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
if(!cnt)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0pk\\ message without cnt");
GetUntilNul(&data_in, &len_in);
if(!data_in)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0pk\\ message without attachment");
if(!strcmp(cnt, "1"))
{
if(id >= 0)
if(CDATA->cdata_id != id)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
if(CDATA->next_step != 1)
return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
if((s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aes", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
aes = atoi(s);
else
aes = false;
// we CANNOT toggle the AES status any more!
// as the server already decided
if(CDATA->wantserver_idfp[0]) // if we know a host key, honor its encryption setting
if(!aes && CDATA->wantserver_aes)
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Stored host key requires encryption, but server did not enable encryption");
}
if(aes && (!d0_rijndael_dll || crypto_aeslevel.integer <= 0))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server insists on encryption too hard");
}
if(!aes && (d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server insists on plaintext too hard");
}
crypto->use_aes = aes != 0;
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "d0pk\\cnt\\2\\id\\%d", CDATA->cdata_id));
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge(CDATA->id, true, false, data_in, len_in, data_out_p, len_out, &status))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_challenge failed");
}
CDATA->next_step = 3;
data_out_p += *len_out;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
else if(!strcmp(cnt, "3"))
{
static char msgbuf[32];
size_t msgbuflen = sizeof(msgbuf);
size_t fpbuflen;
if(id >= 0)
if(CDATA->cdata_id != id)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
if(CDATA->next_step != 3)
return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify(CDATA->id, data_in, len_in, msgbuf, &msgbuflen, &status))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify failed (server authentication error)");
}
if(status)
strlcpy(crypto->server_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_keyfp));
else
crypto->server_keyfp[0] = 0;
memset(crypto->server_idfp, 0, sizeof(crypto->server_idfp));
fpbuflen = FP64_SIZE;
if(!qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id(CDATA->id, crypto->server_idfp, &fpbuflen))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id failed");
}
if(CDATA->wantserver_idfp[0])
if(memcmp(CDATA->wantserver_idfp, crypto->server_idfp, sizeof(crypto->server_idfp)))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server ID does not match stored host key, refusing to connect");
}
fpbuflen = DHKEY_SIZE;
if(!qd0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id(CDATA->id, (char *) crypto->dhkey, &fpbuflen))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id failed");
}
// cache the server key
Crypto_StoreHostKey(&cls.connect_address, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "%d %s@%s", crypto->use_aes ? 1 : 0, crypto->server_idfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s]), false);
if(CDATA->c >= 0)
{
// client will auth next
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "d0pk\\cnt\\4\\id\\%d", CDATA->cdata_id));
if(!qd0_blind_id_copy(CDATA->id, pubkeys[CDATA->c]))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_copy failed");
}
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start(CDATA->id, true, false, "XONOTIC", 8, data_out_p, len_out)) // len_out receives used size by this op
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_start failed");
}
CDATA->next_step = 5;
data_out_p += *len_out;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
else
{
// session key is FINISHED (no server part is to be expected)! By this, all keys are set up
crypto->authenticated = true;
CDATA->next_step = 0;
// assume we got the empty challenge to finish the protocol
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, "challenge ");
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
--*len_out; // remove NUL terminator
return CRYPTO_REPLACE;
}
}
else if(!strcmp(cnt, "5"))
{
size_t fpbuflen;
unsigned char dhkey[DHKEY_SIZE];
int i;
if(id >= 0)
if(CDATA->cdata_id != id)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
if(CDATA->next_step != 5)
return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
if(CDATA->s < 0) // only if server didn't auth
{
if((s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aes", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
aes = atoi(s);
else
aes = false;
if(CDATA->wantserver_idfp[0]) // if we know a host key, honor its encryption setting
if(!aes && CDATA->wantserver_aes)
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Stored host key requires encryption, but server did not enable encryption");
}
if(aes && (!d0_rijndael_dll || crypto_aeslevel.integer <= 0))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server insists on encryption too hard");
}
if(!aes && (d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server insists on plaintext too hard");
}
crypto->use_aes = aes != 0;
}
PutWithNul(&data_out_p, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "d0pk\\cnt\\6\\id\\%d", CDATA->cdata_id));
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_response(CDATA->id, data_in, len_in, data_out_p, len_out))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_response failed");
}
fpbuflen = DHKEY_SIZE;
if(!qd0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id(CDATA->id, (char *) dhkey, &fpbuflen))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id failed");
}
// XOR the two DH keys together to make one
for(i = 0; i < DHKEY_SIZE; ++i)
crypto->dhkey[i] ^= dhkey[i];
// session key is FINISHED! By this, all keys are set up
crypto->authenticated = true;
CDATA->next_step = 0;
data_out_p += *len_out;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, "Got unknown d0_blind_id message from server");
}
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
}
size_t Crypto_SignData(const void *data, size_t datasize, int keyid, void *signed_data, size_t signed_size)
{
if(keyid < 0 || keyid >= MAX_PUBKEYS)
return 0;
if(!pubkeys_havepriv[keyid])
return 0;
if(qd0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign(pubkeys[keyid], true, false, (const char *)data, datasize, (char *)signed_data, &signed_size))
return signed_size;
return 0;
}
size_t Crypto_SignDataDetached(const void *data, size_t datasize, int keyid, void *signed_data, size_t signed_size)
{
if(keyid < 0 || keyid >= MAX_PUBKEYS)
return 0;
if(!pubkeys_havepriv[keyid])
return 0;
if(qd0_blind_id_sign_with_private_id_sign_detached(pubkeys[keyid], true, false, (const char *)data, datasize, (char *)signed_data, &signed_size))
return signed_size;
return 0;
}
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