diff --git a/qw/source/net_packetlog.c b/qw/source/net_packetlog.c
index 2371e36be..fd7ed7bd1 100644
--- a/qw/source/net_packetlog.c
+++ b/qw/source/net_packetlog.c
@@ -506,8 +506,8 @@ Parse_Server_Packet ()
 					break;
 				case svc_print:
 					// FIXME: i==PRINT_CHAT
-					Net_LogPrintf (" [%d]", MSG_ReadByte (&packet));
-					Net_LogPrintf (" %s", MSG_ReadString (&packet));
+					Net_LogPrintf ("[%d] ", MSG_ReadByte (&packet));
+					Net_LogPrintf ("%s", MSG_ReadString (&packet));
 					break;
 				case svc_stufftext:
 					Net_LogPrintf ("%s", MSG_ReadString (&packet));
diff --git a/qw/source/sv_send.c b/qw/source/sv_send.c
index c5b4f893b..843e911dc 100644
--- a/qw/source/sv_send.c
+++ b/qw/source/sv_send.c
@@ -719,14 +719,21 @@ SV_SendClientMessages (void)
 		}
 		// if the reliable message overflowed, drop the client
 		if (c->netchan.message.overflowed) {
+			int i;
 			extern void Analyze_Server_Packet (byte *data, int len);
-			byte *data = Hunk_TempAlloc (c->netchan.message.cursize + 8);
+			byte *data = Hunk_TempAlloc (MAX_MSGLEN + 8);
 
 			memset (data, 0, 8);
+
 			memcpy (data + 8, c->netchan.message.data,
 					c->netchan.message.cursize);
 			Analyze_Server_Packet (data, c->netchan.message.cursize + 8);
 
+			for (i = 0; i < c->num_backbuf; i++) {
+				memcpy (data + 8, c->backbuf_data[i], c->backbuf_size[i]);
+				Analyze_Server_Packet (data, c->backbuf_size[i] + 8);
+			}
+
 			SZ_Clear (&c->netchan.message);
 			SZ_Clear (&c->datagram);
 			SV_BroadcastPrintf (PRINT_HIGH, "%s overflowed\n", c->name);